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11 Introduction
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models provide economists with an organized
framework that can be used to analyze economic phenomena. When these models include a rich
structure (with nominal and real rigidities, and a relatively large number of shocks), they have been
able to forecast macroeconomic variables fairly well; and in some cases they outperform competing
models, such as Vector Autoregressions (Smets and Wouters, 2003). Over the last few years,
these models have been extended to include open economy features, and they are now regarded as
commonplace tools that are used by central banks around the world for monetary policy analysis
and forecasting purposes.1
In this paper, we build a small open economy DSGE model, and analyze its implications for
optimal monetary policy in South Africa. In particular, we investigate whether the central bank
should condition on exchange rate movements when it sets its interest rate policy. Nominal currency
depreciation feeds into domestic in
ation directly by increasing the foreign component of CPI,
and indirectly through its eect on the marginal costs of domestic producers. This warrants a
contractionary response through an increase in the interest rate, but that in turn would increase
the variability of output, especially when currency depreciation rates are volatile. The optimal
response of the central bank to exchange rate 
uctuations depends on the quantitative importance
of these eects. Current currency depreciation could also provide additional information to the
central bank regarding current CPI in
ation, when the central bank can observe in
ation rates
only with a lag. This informational aspect supports the use of an interest rate rule that also
responds to currency depreciation.
The structure of the model we use in this paper is similar to that of Justiniano and Preston
(forthcoming), Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) and Gali and Monacelli (2005).2 We consider a
small open economy with imperfect competition, incomplete asset markets, partial exchange rate
pass-through, and other commonly used nominal and real rigidities, such as sticky prices, price
indexation and habit formation. The model includes a relatively large set of disturbances, nine in
total.3 Domestic shocks to demand, productivity, the interest rate and mark-up (i.e. domestic cost-
1See for example Gali and Monacelli (2005), and Justinano and Preston (forthcoming) for recent examples of
DSGE models with a small open economy. Tovar (2008) provides a recent summary of the DSGE models utilized by
dierent central banks.
2Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming) construct a similar model for Australia, Canada and New Zealand; Ortiz
and Sturzenegger (2007) construct a similar (but smaller) model for South Africa to consider changes to monetary
policy; and Gali and Monacelli (2005) construct a calibrated model for small open economies.
3The use of a large set of shocks, as well as features such as price indexation to generate in
ation persistence,
2push shocks) are commonly used in closed economy New Keynesian DSGE models (c.f. Rabanal
and Rubio, 2005). We also add a country risk-premium shock to break the interest-parity condition,
and a foreign cost-push shock to break the law-of-one-price for imported goods (as per Justiniano
and Preston, forthcoming). The other three shocks also relate to the foreign sector; namely foreign
output, in
ation and interest rates. We estimate the model using Bayesian methods and recent
South African macroeconomic data. We then discuss the implications of the model using impulse
responses generated by each of the shocks. The simulated moments generated by the model match
the moments of their data counterparts fairly well. The variance decomposition exercise indicates
that most of the volatility of output is due to demand shocks, and most of the volatility in CPI-
in
ation is due to foreign cost-push shocks.
The model is then used to investigate the degree to which monetary policy should be conducted
in response to changes in past interest rates, in
ation, output gap, and the exchange rate, when
monetary policy follows a generalized Taylor rule. Due to the presence of cost-push shocks, the
Central Bank faces a tradeo in reducing the volatility of in
ation and output. Optimal estimates
for the policy rule coecients are obtained by minimizing a loss function that includes the variance of
in
ation, output and the interest rate. We nd that the optimal Taylor rule places more emphasis on
in
ation and output than the estimated Taylor rule coecients, and almost no weight on the nominal
exchange rate. These results are similar to the ndings of Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming)
who study optimal monetary policy in the context of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, but in
contradiction to the ndings of Smets and Wouters (2002) who study this issue for the Euro area.
In the following section, we describe the model economy. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the estimation
of the parameters and the implications of the model. Optimal monetary policy is presented in
Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model Economy
We formulate a New Keynesian, small open economy DSGE model that is similar to those of
Monacelli (2003), Gali and Monacelli (2005), and Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming). Nominal
rigidities are introduced in the form of quadratic price adjustment costs for monopolistically com-
petitive intermediate goods producers (Rotemberg, 1982). We abstract from secular real growth
has been advocated by, among others, Christiano et. al (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). Canova and
Sala (2006) and Chari et al. (2008) suggest that the inclusion of these elements may result in identication problems
during estimation, and that some of the shocks and features commonly used in this literature, such as mark-up
shocks and price indexation, may not be structural or consistent with microeconomic evidence.
3and assume zero in
ation at the steady-state of the model.4 We also abstract from money, since
monetary policy is conducted through an interest rate rule, and money demand plays no specic
role in the analysis (Woodford, 2003).5
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical and innitely-lived households. The




















where t indexes time,  is the time-discount factor, 1= is the intertemporal-elasticity of substitu-
tion, and 1=
 is the Frisch-elasticity of labor supply.  is a consumption habit parameter. The habit
level of consumption depends on past aggregate consumption, C, and is treated as an externality by
the households (Abel, 1990).6  is an exogenous demand shock, whose natural logarithm follows
an AR(1) process7
logt =  logt 1 + ";t: (2)


















where  is a level parameter determining the importance of foreign goods in overall consumption,
and  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
The home good, ch, is purchased at a price of p from domestic nal goods producers, and the
foreign good, cf, is directly imported from foreigners at a price of pf, which is denominated in local
currency. Note that the consumption price index (CPI), pc, is related to the domestic and foreign











4Both of these features could be easily incorporated without aecting the results, provided that the real growth
rates and the rate of in
ation are moderate.
5This is equivalent to including money in the utility function with a separable specication.
6In equilibrium, Ct = ct.
7The 's in the shock processes are the persistence parameters, and the innovations designated by " are assumed
to be Gaussian.
4and CPI-in
ation factor is dened as c
t = pc;t=pc;t 1.8
Denoting the price of the composite consumption good, c, as pc, the consumption aggregate in








The aggregate consumption index implies that in equilibrium the share of home goods and foreign
goods in overall consumption are given respectively by
ch;t
ct







































where w is the nominal wage rate, e is the nominal exchange rate, and  is prots received from
the domestic intermediate goods producers. As explained later, these intermediate rms are mo-
nopolistically competitive and generate pure prots in equilibrium.
Households hold domestic bonds, b, which pay a gross nominal interest of i. They also hold
foreign bonds, b, which pay a gross nominal interest of i where, i is the foreign gross nominal
interest rate and  is a risk-premium factor. The foreign nominal interest rate, i, is exogenously-
determined and follows an AR(2) process:9
logi
t = (1   1;i   2;i)logi + 1;i logi
t 1 + 2;i logi
t 2 + "i;t (9)
where i is the mean of i
t. The risk-premium factor, , is given by
t 1 = exp(t 1   at 1) (10)
where  is an exogenous risk-premium shock, and  > 0 regulates the sensitivity of the risk-premium
8The theoretical CPI, pc, is a perfect price index which takes into account the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods. We will ignore this in our estimation which uses the empirical counterpart of CPI.
9Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming) also consider using a VAR specication for the three foreign variables,
namely, foreign interest rates, in
ation and output. They report that the results are very similar to the case where
they use separate AR(2) processes for these foreign variables. We do not follow the VAR route in this paper since
we already have a large number of parameters to estimate.






where y is the steady-state value of real GDP.10 The exogenous risk premium shock is assumed to
follow an AR(1) process given by
t = (1   ) + t 1 + ";t (12)
where  is the mean of t.
The households' problem is to maximize utility subject to its budget constraint and appropriate
No-Ponzi conditions. In equilibrium, the marginal utility of increasing current consumption is
equated to the marginal disutility from reducing current income:
t (ct   ct 1)
  = t (13)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the household's budget constraint. Similarly, the households
determine their labor supply by equating the marginal disutility from work to the marginal utility




t = t (wt=pt): (14)











where t+1=t is the stochastic discount factor, and  is the in
ation factor (derived from the
GDP-de
ator), dened by t = pt=pt 1.













where d is the depreciation factor of domestic currency, dened by dt = et=et 1.
10To obtain some intuition for the risk-premium specication, consider the case where foreign bond-holdings, and
therefore a, is negative. Then, an increase in foreign debt or a positive risk-premium shock increases the risk-premium
. We need debt-elastic interest rates to ensure that the stochastic discount factor in the model is stationary. See
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for more on this issue.
62.2 Production
Domestic production is undertaken by two types of rms: nal goods producers and intermediate
goods producers. The intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive, and they hire
labor to produce dierentiated products. These products are then aggregated by the nal goods
rms into a homogenous product that can be used for home consumption, ch, or for exports, c
h.
The nal goods rms are perfectly competitive; they are introduced into the model for tractability
only, as is customary in many New Keynesian models.
2.2.1 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers are perfectly competitive. They purchase dierentiated home-goods, y (j),
from the intermediate goods producers indexed by j. They aggregate these dierentiated goods










where t is the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods. Let  be the steady-
state value of t. Then as we show later, at the steady-state, =(   1) is the gross mark-up over
marginal cost that monopolistically competitive intermediate rms charge when they make their
pricing decisions. We follow Rabanal and Rubio (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003), and let
t = t=(t   1) which is specied as an exogenous and i.i.d. mark-up shock; hence,
logt = log + ";t (18)
where  = =(   1).11
The nal output good is either consumed domestically, designated by ch, or exported abroad,
designated by c
h; hence,
yt = ch;t + c
h;t: (19)
Since the nal goods producers are perfectly competitive, their prot maximization problem is
static and is given by





pt (j)yt (j)dj (20)
11Note that assuming i.i.d. mark-up shocks also facilitates easier identication of the price indexation parameters
in the estimation.
7where p(j) is the price of the intermediate good j. p
h is the export price of the home-origin good
in units of the foreign currency, and e is the nominal exchange rate (in units of domestic currency
per unit of foreign currency). We assume that the nal goods producers do not price discrimate
when they export; hence,
etp
h;t = pt: (21)
























where  is a persistence parameter determining the extent to which current level of exports are
determined by past exports.12  is a level parameter regulating the share of the home-produced
consumption goods in the overall expenditure of foreigners. The foreign aggregate output level, y
t,
is determined exogenously and follows an AR(2) process:
logy
t = (1   1;y   2;y)logy + 1;y logy
t 1 + 2;y logy
t 2 + "y;t: (24)
The foreign aggregate price level, p





t 1 follows an AR(2) process:
log
t = 1; log
t 1 + 2; log
t 2 + ";t: (25)
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a unit measure of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers indexed by
j. Their technology is described by the following production function:
yt (j) = ztnt (j) (26)
12This persistence can be motivated by a habit specication in the utility of foreigners (Lim and McNelis, 2008).
8where z is the aggregate productivity shock, and n(j) is the amount of (homogenous) labor input
used in the production of intermediate good j. The aggregate productivity shock follows an AR(1)
process:
logzt = z logzt 1 + "z;t: (27)
The intermediate goods rms take the demand function of the nal goods producers as given
and set prices to maximize the present value of prots. The rms discount future earnings at the

























where the last term is the quadratic cost of price adjustment. The parameter  regulates the
magnitude of the price adjustment costs, which is also scaled by the aggregate domestic output.
The price-adjustment cost is incurred when the increase in the rm's own price deviates from the
past in
ation rate, where the parameter ' regulates the extent to which current price changes are
indexed to past in
ation.13
We assume that the price adjustment costs do not aect the actual cash-
ow of the rms, but
only aect their objective function (c.f. De Paoli et. al, 2007).14 The intermediate rms distribute











The rm's maximization with respect to its own price, after imposing a symmetric equilibrium








































When log-linearized, the above expression is the familiar New Keynesian Phillips curve with index-
ation,
b t   'b t 1 = Et [b t+1   'b t] +
   1

[b t + b wt   b pt   b zt] (31)
13Price adjustment costs in New Keynesian models were introduced by Rotemberg (1982). The specication here
is similar to Ireland (2001), except that in his model, current price changes are indexed to the past price changes of
the individual rm instead of the aggregate in
ation rate.
14Alternatively, one could assume these price adjustment costs are real costs, and therefore aect the feasibility
condition of the model (c.f. Chugh, 2007). Note however, this alternative specication yields equivalent results when
the model is solved by log-linearization, since the adjustment costs are of higher order than linear.
9where deviations in current in
ation from the steady-state is determined by deviations in past
in
ation, expected future in
ation, mark-up shocks and the marginal costs of rms.15
2.2.3 Foreign Producers
Foreign producers can also be modeled in a similar fashion, although here we opt to simply consider
their nal pricing equation in log-linearized form, instead of describing their pricing problem fully.
We assume that foreign goods are imported directly from foreigners who engage in monopolistic
competition themselves, and that they price-to-market when they sell their goods to the domestic
market.16 Their pricing equation is given by




b qt   b st + b 	t

(32)
where f is the in
ation in the foreign goods price; f;t = pf;t=pf;t 1. ' is an indexation parameter,
and  is the foreign cost of price-adjustment. Analogous to the domestic mark-up shock, 	t is an
exogenous cost-push shock whose logarithm is assumed to be distributed i.i.d.:
log	t = "	;t: (33)
The real exchange rate, q, is dened as qt = etp
t=pt.17 The terms-of-trade, s, is dened as pf=p.
Their dierence is analogous to the marginal cost of foreign producers (actually intermediaries)
who buy the product at etp
t and sell it at pf;t. This dierence can also be thought as the deviation
from the law-of-one-price, b  f;t (Monacelli, 2005):
b  f;t = b et + b p
t   b pf;t = b qt   b st: (34)
2.3 The Central Bank
The central bank targets the nominal interest rate target using a Taylor rule,
logit = i logit 1 + (1   i)

a logc
t 1 + ay log
yt 1
y
+ ad logdt + logi

+ "i;t; (35)
15A hat over a variable is the log-deviation of the variable from its steady-state.
16A related approach would be to assume that foreign goods are intermediated by domestic importers which
mark-up the foreign price in a staggered fashion (c.f. Justiniano and Preston, forthcoming).
17We assume that the law of 1-price holds at the steady-state; hence, q = 1, where a bar over a variable indicates
its steady-state value.
10where i is the steady-state value of the nominal interest rate. i determines the extent of interest
rate smoothing, and the parameters a, ay, ad determine the importance of CPI in
ation, detrended
output and the nominal depreciation of the exchange rate in the Taylor rule. The last term, "i, is
an i.i.d. interest rate shock which is assumed to be Gaussian.
Note that the central bank conditions its interest rate rule on lagged output and CPI in
ation,
but current depreciation of currency. We use a lagged specication for in
ation and output gap
to capture the delays in data dissemination for these variables, but since current data on exchange
rates are readily available, we use the current depreciation rates.18
We follow Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming) and let the central bank condition on detrended
output as opposed to the model-implied output gap. The model-implied output gap is dened as
the percent dierence between actual output and the natural rate of output, where the natural rate
is the output level that would be achieved if prices were 
exible. The natural rate of output is
unobservable in practice, and therefore detrended output is more commonly used as a measure of
the output gap (Neiss and Nelson, 2005).
2.4 Market Clearing Conditions
All goods, labor and asset markets clear. We assume that domestic bonds are inside bonds; hence,
they are in zero-supply:
bt = 0 (36)






The budget constraint of the households, coupled with the denitions of the pure prots received














18We also estimated our model using current in
ation and output in the Taylor rule, but this alternative speci-
cation generated very similar results. This is in line with the ndings in Taylor (1999).
19Unlike Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming), the prots resulting from the imported goods do not accrue to
domestic consumers in our model, since foreign goods are imported directly from foreigners who price-to-market
when they sell their goods to the domestic market.
11where nx stands for net exports. Note that the national income-expenditure-output identity in the









ct + nxt = ztnt = yt: (39)
The model's equilibrium is dened as prices and allocations such that households maximize util-
ity subject to their budget constraint, the nal goods producers maximize prots, the intermediate
home-goods producers maximize the present value of distributions paid out to households and all
markets clear. We only consider symmetric equilibria where each variable indexed by j is equal
across all intermediate-goods rms.
2.5 Log-linear Approximation to the Model
We log-linearize the variables around their steady-state to obtain a linear system of equations that
characterize the equilibrium of the above model (see the Appendix for the list of equations).20
The South African trade balance as a percent of GDP averaged -1.2% between 1994-2008, but
was positive between 1998 and 2003. With these considerations, we decided to set the steady-state






Setting the risk-premium shock's mean value, , equal to  log
 
i
ensures that (nx=y) = a = 0.21
The core relationships of the model are the IS curve, the Phillips curves, the Taylor rule, the
interest-parity condition and the balance of payments condition.
Using the households' rst-order conditions with respect to consumption and bond holdings,









 (1 + )






+ e t: (41)
20A bar over a variable indicates its steady-state value, and a hat indicates its log-deviation from its steady-state
(i.e. b xt = logxt   logx). For variables that can become negative, namely t and at, we use level-deviations instead
(i.e. b xt = xt   x).
21Note, however, that we do not need to set specic values for  and i, since they do not enter any of the
log-linearized equilibrium conditions.
12where we have redened the demand shock as22
e t =
(1   )(1   )
 (1 + )
b t:
Current consumption demand depends on a weighted average of past and expected future con-
sumption, is inversely related to the real interest rate (where the relevant in
ation is the expected
CPI-in
ation), and is positively related to the demand shocks.
Using the national accounting identity and the denition of net exports, we can relate consump-
tion to output as
b yt = b st + b ct + 
 
b c
h;t   b mt

(42)
where exports, b c
h;t, are determined by past exports, the real exchange rate and foreign output:
b c
h;t = b c
h;t 1 + (1   )(b qt + b y
t): (43)
Imports, b mt = b st + b cf;t, can be expressed as
b mt = b ct + [1    (1   )]b st (44)
whereby increases in overall consumption result in an increase in imports. Note that with  (1   ) <
1, imports would increase at impact, following an increase in the terms-of-trade (i.e. the price of
imported goods, pf, becomes more expensive relative to the home-good prices, p).23
The relationships between the real exhange rate, terms-of-trade and in
ation rates are dened
by
b qt   b qt 1 = b dt + b 
t   b t (45)
b st   b st 1 = b f;t   b t: (46)











c mct + e t (47)
22This is without loss of generality since the demand shock has zero mean, and the redened demand shock follows
an AR(1) process similar to the original demand shock. This transformation helps in the identication of parameters
in the estimation.
23This would help generate a J-curve eect in our model.






ation is aected by lagged in
ation (due to indexation), expected future in
ation, mark-
up shocks and the marginal costs of rms, c mct = b wt   b pt   b zt, which in turn can be expressed as
c mct = 
b yt   (1 + 
)b zt + b st +

1   
(b ct   b ct 1)
which indicates that increases in the terms-of-trade, s, result in an increase in the marginal cost of
domestic rms.
Similarly, the foreign New Keynesian Phillips curve is given by
b f;t =

1 + 'Et [b f;t+1] +
'
1 + 'b f;t 1 +
   1
 (1 + ')
b  f;t + e 	t (48)
where, again, the foreign cost-push shocks are redened as
e 	t =
   1
 (1 + ')
b 	t:
In this foreign-goods Phillips curve, b  f is the change in the deviations from the law-of-one-price,
and is dened as
b  f;t   b  f;t 1 = b dt + b 
t   b f;t:
Note that CPI in
ation, b c, is related to GDP-de
ator in
ation, b , and to imported-goods price
in
ation, b f, with
b c
t = (1   )b t 1 + b f;t 1: (49)
The Taylor rule of the central bank, in log-linearized form, is given by
b it = ib it 1 + (1   i)
h
ab c
t 1 + ayb yt 1 + adb dt
i
+ "i;t: (50)
The rst-order conditions of households with respect to domestic and foreign bonds yield the
interest-parity condition:





b t   b at
i
: (51)
24Similar to the demand shock, this transformation is without loss of generality.
14An increase in the interest rate dierential strengthens the currency today, but causes expected
depreciation tomorrow to rise. Similarly, an increase in the country risk premium depreciates the
currency today, but reduces expected depreciation in the future.
The balance of payments equation equates the 
ow of assets with the 





b at 1 = 
 
b c




In this section we describe the estimation procedure using Bayesian techniques, the data used in
the estimation, and the prior distributions of the parameters.
3.1 Bayesian Estimation
The dynamic linear system of equations characterizing equilibrium can be summarized as
Et [f (t+1;t;t 1;ut;)] = 0; ut  NID[0;V ()] (53)
where t is the vector of variables, ut is the vector containing the orthogonal Gaussian shocks whose
variance-covariance matrix is given by the diagonal matrix V , and  is the vector of parameters.25,26
Given the parameter values, , the Blanchard-Kahn method can be used to nd the policy functions
that describe how the variables, t, evolve over time as a function of their past values, t 1, and the
current realization of shocks, ut, under rational expectations. These policy functions, g, are linear
in the variables, and can be written as:27
t = g (t 1;ut;) = g ()t 1 + gu ()ut: (54)
The above solution can be thought of as the transition equation of a state-space representation,
describing the evolution of all variables in the model, including the unobservables. The measurement
25Since the foreign shock processes are specied as AR(2) processes, the vector of current variables t includes
the rst lags of the foreign variables.
26Note that we set  =  log
 
i
to ensure that (nx=y) = a = 0, but we do not need to set specic values for 
and i since they do not enter any of the log-linearized equilibrium conditions. Similarly, the export parameter, ,
does not enter any of the log-linearized equations; hence, is ignored in the estimation.
27See Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Uhlig (1999), and the Dynare manual for more on this.
15equation describes how the full set of variables are related to the observed variables, 
t . Since we
assume no measurement error, our measurement equation is given by

t = Mt (55)
where M is a matrix that picks the elements of t that are observable.




rule implies that the posterior distribution of the parameters is proportional to the product of the
prior and the likelihood function
(j) _ L(j)() (56)
where the likelihood function, L(j), is evaluated using the Kalman lter (Hamilton, 1994, and
Ireland, 2001). To construct the entire posterior distribution and identify its corresponding mo-
ments, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (McMc) simulation methods are employed (An and Schorfheide,
2007, and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez, 2004). We use the estimation software Dynare
to estimate the parameters and compute the policy functions.28
3.2 The Data
To estimate the model, we use eight observable variables that are measured at a quarterly frequency
for the period 1994Q1 - 2008Q4: detrended output, b y, GDP-de
ator in
ation, b , CPI-in
ation, b c,
nominal interest rate, b i, nominal currency depreciation, b d, foreign detrended output, b y, foreign
GDP-de
ator in
ation, b , and foreign nominal interest rate, b i.29 The South African Reserve
Bank (SARB) Quarterly Bulletins are the source of the South African data, with the exception of
CPI-in
ation which was sourced from Statistics South Africa. The foreign variables are proxied by
measures of the U.S. economy, and the sources of data are the Bureau of Economic Analysis and
the Federal Reserve Board.
Since the model is quarterly, the measures of in
ation rates and interest rates are expressed as
28Dynare uses Christopher Sim's csminwel optimization algorithm to nd the mode, and the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm to nd the moments of the posterior distribution. The estimated means of the posterior distributions are
then used in constructing the policy functions using the Blanchard-Kahn method. See the Dynare manual for more
details.
29There was a break in the South African data series in 1993, so we chose not to include data prior to 1994.
16non-annualized quarterly rates.30 The measures of detrended output are expressed as the percent-
age deviation of quarterly real GDP from their linear trends.31 The domestic and foreign interest
rates, b i and b i, are represented respectively by the South African three-month treasury-bill rate,
and the U.S. Federal Funds rate. The depreciation rate of currency, b d, is the quarterly percentage
change in the South African rand (per unit of foreign currency calculated by a trade-weighted mea-
sure). Since the model assumes zero in
ation at the steady state, the data for the in
ation rates
and the model counterparts are demeaned.
3.3 The Prior Distributions
The prior distributions for the parameters are given in Table 1, and are very similar to the ones
used in Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming). We calibrate (i.e. specify dogmatic priors for) the
time-discount parameter, , and the import share parameter, , to make sure that the model's
steady-state will be able to match the observed mean interest rate and trade ratio in the data
(Ireland, 2001). We set  = 0:99, re
ecting a 4% annual real interest rate at the steady-state. The
ratio of South African imports to GDP averaged about 28% over the sample period; hence we set
 = 0:28. The estimation had trouble identifying the elasticity of risk-premium with respect to the
ratio of foreign debt to gdp parameter, ; hence we follow Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming)
and set it equal to 0.01.
The prior for the habit parameter, , is fairly uninformative with a beta-distribution that has
a mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.25. To generate hump-shaped impulse responses for
output, the model requires a high level of persistence in export demand. Hence, we assume that
the  parameter has a beta prior with a mean of 0.8 and a standard deviation of 0.1.
For , the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, we specify a gamma prior
with a mean of 1.2 and a standard deviation of 0.4. The parameter  has a gamma prior with a
mean of 1.5 and a standard deviation of 0.75, re
ecting a priori expectation of a high elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods. The parameter 
 also has a gamma prior with a
mean of 1.5 (re
ecting a Frisch-elasticity of labor supply of 2/3) and a standard deviation of 0.75.
The use of uninformative priors for the price indexation parameters ' and ' generated low
posterior estimates; which results in the model failing to generate in
ation persistence, and hump-
30The annualized quarterly expressions for the deviations of in
ation and interest rate from their steady-states
are 4 times their non-annualized quarterly gures.
31Estimation results using HP-ltered output were very similar to those using linear detrending.
17shaped impulse responses for in
ation. Therefore, we consider beta distributions with a mean of
0.7 and a standard deviation of 0.1 for these parameters.32
The price-adjustment cost parameter, , and the elasticity of substitution between the interme-
diate goods, , appear only in the Phillips curve expression and cannot be separately identied. We
therefore calibrate the  parameter to 6 which implies  = 1:2; i.e intermediate rms charge a 20%
mark-up in price over marginal cost (Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez, 2005, and Smets and Wouters,
2003). Note that with a Calvo-pricing setting for the intermediate goods producers (Calvo, 1983),
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where  is the fraction of rms that keep their prices constant in any given period, and 1=(1   ) is
the average duration of price stickiness (Justiniano and Preston, forthcoming). This is equivalent
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With price stickiness that extends over ve quarters,  is equal to 4=5, and the right hand side of the
above expression is close to 1=20. This would imply that with  = 6,  is about 100. Taking these
factors into consideration, the price-adjustment cost parameters for domestic and foreign goods, 
and , are both assumed to have a gamma prior with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 20.
The relatively high and informative priors that are used for the price-adjustment cost parameters
help match the magnitudes of the impulses generated from our model, especially for in
ation and
output, to the corresponding impulses generated by the forecasting model of the SARB (Smal et.
al, 2007).
For the Taylor rule parameters, we again follow Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming), and
assume that the priors for a, ay, and ad all have a gamma distribution with means of 1.5, 0.25
and 0.25 respectively. Note that these are long-run response coecients in a Taylor rule that uses
non-annualized quarterly data. If we had utilized annualized gures for the interest rate, in
ation
and currency depreciation, the corresponding coecient for the output gap would have been four
times higher than the one we use here. The prior for the interest rate smoothing parameter, i, has
32These priors are slightly more informative than Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming), but is in line with Smets
and Wouters (2003).
18a beta distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.25.33
The prior distributions used for the other domestic shocks re
ect moderately high persistence
with mean 0.8 and standard deviation 0.1.34 The priors for the standard deviations of all the
domestic shocks are fairly uninformative, with an inverse-gamma distribution with a mean of 0.5%
and innite variance.
The priors for the standard deviation of the foreign shocks are the same as those for the domestic
shocks. For the persistence parameters of the foreign variables, we considered normal-distributed
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In this section, we rst present the estimates for the posterior distributions of the parameters. We
then report some of the key implications of our model; including the impulse responses of the model
variables to innovations in each of the shocks, the simulated moments of the model variables, and
their forecast error variance decomposition.
4.1 The Posterior Moments
The estimates for the mean and the 10%-90% marks of the posterior distributions of the parameters
are reported in Table 1. The density functions for the posteriors are plotted along with the priors
in Figures (1)-(4).35
The mean estimates for the Taylor rule parameters are, by and large, standard. The Taylor rule
is fairly persistent with mean i equal to 0.92, and the mean estimates for a, ay, and ad are 1.42,
0.29 and 0.25 respectively, implying that the SARB does condition partially on the depreciation
rate of its currency. The estimates for a and ay are heavily in
uenced by the choice of the prior,
as can be seen from Figure (3). The Taylor rule coecients are consistent with previous estimates
33Our results were very similar when we used slightly dierent priors for the Taylor rule parameters. In particular,
we tried a gamma distribution with a mean of 0.125 and a standard deviation of 0.125 for the output coecient ay,
and a beta prior for i with a mean of 0.7 and a standard deviation of 0.1, as in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005).
34This is except for the mark-up and the external cost-push shocks, which were assumed to be i.i.d.:
35For the Metropolis-Hastings algrorithm in Dynare, we use ve chains of 100,000 draws each with a 45% initial
burn-in phase. The acceptance rate for each chain is about 28%.
19in the literature regarding monetary policy in South Africa, possibly with the exception of the
coecient on in
ation (Woglom, 2003).
The shocks are also fairly persistent, partly due to the prior distributions assumed for these
parameters. The innovations to the risk premium and the external cost-push shocks have fairly
large standard deviations, while the innovation to the Taylor rule has a standard deviation of 0.24%
(i.e. about 1% annualized), similar to the estimates for the U.S. and the European Union (Smets
and Wouters, 2003). The persistence and the standard deviation parameters of the productivity
shock are not well identied by the data, as the prior and the posterior distributions for these
parameters are almost identical.36
The habit parameter, , has a mean equal to 0.83, which is fairly high despite the uninformative
prior that was imposed in the estimation. The indexation parameters in the Phillips curves, '
and ', have estimated means of 0.47 and 0.61. When we initially estimated these parameters
with uninformative priors, we found that the mean of their posteriors had very low values; this
did not generate hump-shaped impulse responses for output and in
ation, which is more in line
with previous VAR evidence. Smets and Wouters (2003) nd that habits and price indexation
play an important role in generating intrinsic persistence in the model; this led us to employ more
informative priors for these parameters.
The mean of the posterior distribution for 
 is 1.59, corresponding to a labor supply elasticity
of 0.68, which is within the range of values typically obtained in the literature. The elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods, , is estimated as 0.57, which is similar to the results
of Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming), despite the high prior mean. The mean estimates for the
price-adjustment cost parameters,  and , are 96.6 and 112.8, which, according to equation (58),
implies an average duration of price stickiness of about ve quarters for both home and imported
goods prices. The data does not appear to identify these parameters particularly well (especially
the domestic price-adjustment cost parameter), and the resulting estimates are driven mainly by
their prior values. The estimates for price stickiness are somewhat higher than those found in other
studies (Smets and Wouters, 2003). Lower adjustment costs, however, generate unreasonably high
impulse responses to output and in
ation at the impact period of a monetary shock. The SARB
forecasting model, for example, suggests that 100 basis points increase in the annualized interest
rate leads to about a 40 basis points decline in annualized in
ation and a 20 basis points decline
36Both the i.i.d. mark-up shock and the productivity shock aect marginal costs in a similar fashion, so separate
identication of these shocks requires more data than was used in the estimation. We choose not to do this here
since we have abstracted from capital in the production function.
20in detrended output (Smal et. al, 2007). Generating similar magnitudes in our model requires the
price stickiness to last about 5-6 quarters.
4.2 Impulse Responses
In Figures (5)-(10), we plot the impulse responses of the key variables in the model to a one
standard-deviation innovation in each shock. The impulse responses obtained are, by and large,
standard.
Following a positive innovation in the Taylor rule (i.e. a positive "i), output, consumption, and
in
ation all decline, while the currency strengthens at impact period. The trade balance to GDP
ratio improves as a result of declining output, but this is reversed over time. The magnitudes of the
impulses are in line with other studies on monetary policy in South Africa (Smal et. al, 2007, and
Harjes and Ricci, 2008). A near 80 basis points increase in the annualized interest rate, reduces
annualized CPI in
ation by about 90 basis points and output by about 35 basis points.
A positive innovation to productivity, "z, increases output in a hump-shaped manner. The shock
also eases in
ationary pressure, which leads to a reduction in the interest rate (since the Taylor
rule coecient on in
ation is stronger than the coecients on output and depreciation).
The impulse responses also move in the expected directions following an innovation to the de-
mand shock, "e . A positive demand shock increases consumption and output, which fuels in
ation
and causes the interest rate to rise. In addition, the currency depreciates along with a deterioration
in the trade-balance-to-GDP ratio.
A positive innovation to the mark-up shock, "e , increases in
ation and lowers output (and
consumption and labor). As such, a positive mark-up shock acts as a cost-push shock, which shifts
the Phillips curve and presents a less favorable tradeo between in
ation and output to the SARB.
The currency depreciates after the impact period while interest rates rise, since the Taylor rule
places more emphasis on rising in
ation.
A shock to the risk premium through a positive innovation to " raises the domestic interest
rate, causing a depreciation of the currency and higher in
ation. The net-exports-to-GDP ratio
decreases at impact, but eventually becomes positive due to the increase in exports. Output
increases accordingly even when consumption declines (not shown).
The innovation to the foreign cost-push shock, "e 	, increases the price of imported goods, which
causes the trade balance to deteriorate. The currency depreciates, and eventually net exports
21become positive through the J-curve eect as agents eventually start to move away from more
costly imported goods. CPI in
ation increases due to import prices, and consumption declines.
Output declines at impact as both consumption and net exports decline. Interest rates rise because
in
ation and currency depreciation rates increase.
The impulses to the foreign shocks also behave as expected (not shown). The foreign interest rate
shocks generate similar impulse responses to those of the risk premium shock, and foreign in
ation
shocks generate similar impulse responses to a negative external cost-push shock (i.e. exchange
rate shock).37 A positive innovation in the foreign output shock, "y, increases exports at impact,
appreciates the domestic currency, lowers the terms-of-trade and increases in
ation. However, the
magnitudes of these impulses are rather small.
4.3 Moments of Model Variables and Variance Decomposition
In Table 2, we report the theoretical moments of the model's key variables along with their data
counterparts. In particular, we look at the standard deviation of variables, sd, their cross-correlation
with output, c(:;y), and their autocorrelation coecients at dierent lags, ac(:).
The standard deviations generated by the model match their data counterparts fairly well. The
model generates moderately volatile output with a standard deviation of 2.39%, close to the 2.23%
of the data. The model slightly overestimates the volatility of in
ation numbers in the data; we
get standard deviations of 1.52% and 1.86% for GDP-de
ator and CPI-in
ation respectively, as
opposed to their data counterparts which are about 1.1% each. The model matches the volatility
of nominal currency depreciation fairly well, but slightly overestimates the volatility of the interest
rate.
The model matches the cross-correlations of output with in
ation and the currency depreciation
rates very well. In addition, the model generates a high level of persistence in output, similar to
what is observed in the data. Interest rates also exhibit high persistence due to the fairly high
Taylor rule persistence parameter, i.
The GDP-de
ator in
ation and CPI in
ation are both moderately persistent in the model,
although it is surprising to note that the GDP-de
ator in
ation is not at all persistent in the data.
Currency depreciation also has a low but positive persistence in the data, which could be the result
37The fact that these shocks produce similar impulse responses also points to the diculty in identifying them
separately if foreign data is not explicitly used in the estimation.
22of a managed-
oating policy conducted by the SARB.38 This feature is not replicated by the model,
which produces close to zero persistence in the nominal depreciation rate.
Table 3 reports the unconditional forecast-error variance decomposition of model variables with
respect to each of the shock innovations. Innovations to the Taylor rule seem to play only a small
role in accounting for the volatility in output and in
ation, suggesting that the monetary policy
conducted by the SARB may have reduced economic volatility, and has not directly contributed
to it. Productivity shocks do not explain much of the variation in the key variables of the model,
although as pointed out before, the domestic mark-up shocks aect the economy in similar ways,
and the estimates attribute a much larger role for these domestic cost-push shocks, especially for
GDP-de
ator in
ation volatility. Similarly, demand shocks are important; they account for more
than a half of the variation in output, and about a third of the variation in GDP-de
ator in
ation.39
The foreign shocks seem to play a negligible role in the economy, except for foreign output which
explains about a quarter of the variation in the real exchange rates and terms of trade. Part of the
reason for the small contribution of foreign shocks could be due to proxying the rest of the world
with the U.S..
About two thirds of the volatility in CPI in
ation is explained by risk premium and external
cost-push shocks. These two open economy shocks also explain about a fth of the variation in
output. The unconditional variance in the currency depreciation rate, the real exchange rate, and
the terms of trade are, to a large extent, due to these open economy shocks as well.
5 Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section, we posit an objective function for monetary policy makers based on the variance
of output, in
ation, and the interest rate. We then investigate the implied Taylor rule coecients
that are optimal from the perspective of this objective function. We restrict attention to optimal
monetary policy in the context of Taylor rules of the form used in the model specied in equation
(50), where the central bank adjusts the current nominal interest rate in response to lagged values
38Central banks of small open economies may choose to manage exchange rates to reduce the level of uncertainty
that is encountered in the export sector, thereby promoting international trade. In addition, a stable exchange
rate may reduce uncertainty in nancial markets, credibility and liability dollarization concerns, volatility in prices
(through high pass-through eects), business cycle volatility, and the disruptive speculative activities of currency
traders.
39Although previous studies of small open economies suggest that demand shocks aect the variation in measures
of in
ation to a similar degree, they have not always found that they play such an important role in the variation of
output (Enders and Hurn, 2006).
23of the interest rate, CPI in
ation, detrended output, and the current currency depreciation.
It is an open question in the literature as to whether a central bank of an open economy should
condition on exchange rate movements when it sets its interest rate policy (Monacelli, 2005, and
Justiniano and Preston, 2008). Exchange rate movements directly aect the foreign component of
CPI in
ation, and indirectly aect the domestic component of CPI in
ation through their eect on
the marginal cost of domestic producers. Hence, higher currency depreciation warrants a contrac-
tionary response by the central bank through an increase in the interest rate. In the presence of
volatile exchange rates, however, this would cause frequent changes in interest rates and increase the
variability of output. The optimal response of a central bank is therefore ambiguous and depends
on the quantitative importance of these eects.
With our specication of the Taylor rule, the central bank cannot condition on current in
ation
rates (perhaps proxying for lags in information gathering), but can condition on current currency
depreciation. Since current nominal currency depreciation feeds into current in
ation, there may
also be an informational gain on the part of policy makers to warrant conditioning on exchange
rate movements.
5.1 The Loss Function of the Central Bank
We do not use the utility function of the representative household as the policy makers' objective
function since the consumption variance generated from the model is unrealistically high.40 Instead,
we posit a loss function for policy makers that depends on the variation in CPI in
ation, detrended














where y;i > 0 are the weights on variation in output and interest rates relative to the variation
in in
ation.
The loss function (59) can be evaluated for each set of policy parameters in the Taylor rule,
a; ay, ad; and i. Since all the other parameters are structural, we assume that they cannot be
aected by monetary policy makers. We also ignore parameter uncertainty, and keep the values of
40See Ambler et. al (2004) for an optimal open economy Taylor rule generated using the utility function of the
representative household. They also consider the impact of money in the utility function since their Taylor rule
responds to money supply growth as well.
41Note that from a utility maximizing perspective, minimizing the variation in output may not be optimal if most
of the variation in detrended output is due to changes in productivity (i.e. changes in the natural rate of output).
24the structural parameters at the estimated means of their posterior distribution.
Considering the limiting case with  = 1, the objective function of the policy makers is analogous
to minimizing a weighted sum of the unconditional variances:





For given values for the weight parameters, y and i, we calculate the set of policy parameters that
minimizes the loss function above. We restrict attention to policy parameters which are consistent
with long-run stability; hence a > 1 and 0   < 1. Since the choice of weights is somewhat
arbitrary, we repeat this procedure for dierent values of y and i.
5.2 Optimal Taylor Rule Coecients
As a preliminary exercise, we rst x three of the four policy parameters to the estimated values
of their posterior mean, and then compute the loss function for all possible values of the remaining
policy parameter. The results are given in Figure (11), where we set y = 0:5 and i = 1. The
partially-optimal policy (keeping three of the four coecients equal to their estimated values)
prefers higher long-run response coecients for in
ation and output, but similar coecients for
the currency depreciation rate and the lagged interest rate. These partially-optimal coecients are
3.42, 1.21, 0.35 and 0.89 on in
ation, output, currency depreciation, and smoothing respectively.
Next, we let all of the four policy parameters to vary simultaneously and report the results in
Table 4. For reference, the estimated values from the model are given in column (1). In column
(2), we allow all of the coecients in the Taylor rule to vary, and nd that the optimal policy
requires nearly a unit root in interest rates.42 Consequently, in the remaining columns we set the
coecient on the smoothing parameter, i, equal to its estimated value of 0.916, and optimize over
the remaining parameters. With y = 0:5 and i = 1, the optimal long-run response coecients
for in
ation, output and currency depreciation are found as 2.71, 1.20, and 0.01 respectively. The
coecients on in
ation and output are higher than the estimated Taylor rule coecients, and the
coecient on the currency depreciation is almost zero - see column (3). Columns (4)-(5) illustrate
how the optimal policy varies with the relative weight on the output variance. Column (6) illustrates
the sensitivity of the results to the relative weight on interest rate smoothing, i.
42Note that the long-run coecients on in
ation and output are very high in this case, but these need to be
multiplied by 1   i to get the short-term responses. These are of the same order of magnitude as the short-run
responses obtained from the estimated coecients.
25The results in columns (3)-(6) tell a fairly consistent story; an optimal policy rule: i) will only
have a modest impact on the standard deviation of in
ation - at most a decrease of 16.7% calculated
from columns (1) and (5); ii) will have somewhat more of an impact on the standard deviation of
output - at most a decrease of 43.9% calculated from columns (1) and (4); iii) the reduction in
in
ation and output volatility comes at the cost of greater interest rate volatility; iv) requires
making the interest rate more sensitive to past in
ation rates and output gaps - with the exception
of column (5); v) involves a modest tradeo between output volatility and in
ation volatility - see
columns (4) and (5) for example; vi) requires little or no feedback from the currency depreciation
rate.43
This last result is important because it provides more evidence in support of Justiniano and
Preston's (forthcoming) nding that optimal policy in small open economies places no weight on
the exchange rate. We would expect to nd that the model's optimal Taylor rule coecient values
are larger than the estimated coecients, since the SARB would be more cautious in its monetary
policy in the presence of data, model and parameter uncertainty (which we do not account for
in the model). We indeed nd larger optimal response coecients for in
ation and output, but
surprisingly the optimal coecient for currency depreciation is much smaller than the estimated
value, and close to zero. This result is partially due to the fact that the risk premium shock
accounts for a large portion of the variation in currency depreciation, but a much smaller portion
of the variation in output, CPI in
ation and interest rates. This implies that, if the SARB were
to respond to variations in the rate of currency depreciation, then it would pass the eects of the
risk premium shock onto the domestic economic variables. The close to zero optimal coecient
on currency depreciation also suggests that the informational gain from observing the currency
depreciation rate in a timely fashion is not quantitatively important.
These ndings are in contrast to that of Smets and Wouters (2002) who suggest that optimal
policy for the Euro area is responsive to the exchange rate. Our model is very similar to that
in Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming), and the countries for which they estimate the model
(Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) are relatively small and open, as is South Africa. The
major dierence between these group of countries and South Africa is the greater volatility of the
in
ation and the exchange rates in South Africa.
While we do get similar results for the exchange rate, our results on optimal policy in general
43One might view column (5) as an exception, but recall that these are the long-run coecients. The short-run
coecient on the currency depreciation rate for column (5) is 0.016, so that a 1 standard deviation change in currency
depreciation would call for an immediate 11.6 basis points increase in the interest rate.
26are quite dierent from those of Justiniano and Preston (forthcoming). For example, they nd
that the optimal policy for the countries they studies has much more feedback from in
ation and
output than we have.44 They also nd a much greater tradeo between output and in
ation
volatility, and that policy can have a much greater in
uence on in
ation and output volatility.45
And, nally they do not nd a tradeo between output and in
ation volatility and interest rate
volatility. As opposed to our ndings in Table 4, the optimal Taylor rule in Justiniano and Preston's
(forthcoming) in all cases implies a lower standard deviation in interest rates than the standard
deviation in the corresponding estimated model. The dierence in results would suggest that South
African monetary policy has been more systematic, and shocks to the Taylor rule have been less
important in determining output and in
ation volatility.
Unfortunately, the optimal policy results also have discouraging implications for the in
ation
targeting rule currently in place in South Africa. Even with a zero weight on output, the standard
deviation of the quarterly in
ation rate is 1.55 percent, which corresponds to an annualized rate of
over 6 percent. Note that our model overestimates the volatility of CPI in
ation, so adjusting for
this implies about 4% standard deviation in annualized in
ation. Such volatility suggests that it will
be dicult to maintain annualized in
ation within the current 3 percentage point target range, even
over a 12-month horizon. The relatively small impact that optimal policy has on in
ation volatility
suggests that the Reserve Bank will have to continue the 
exible in
ation targeting regime proposed
by Svensson (2007).
We also tried dierent specications for the Taylor rule; in particular we considered a case where
the SARB conditions on the current values of in
ation and output, and the results were essentially
unchanged.46 We also considered a case where the SARB conditions on lagged values of currency
depreciation as well as lagged values of in
ation and output. The optimal long-run coecients were
largely unchanged in this case as well.
44Justiniano and Preston's (forthcoming) optimal policies always imply a unit root in the interest rate. Con-
sequently, the coecients in their Table 3 are short-run coecients, whereas those in our Table 4 are long-run
coecients. For example, the smallest optimal coecient on in
ation they report is 0.8 and the largest is 2.27. The
largest short-run coecient on in
ation in our Table 4 - excluding column (2) - is 0.316 in column (6). They report
small coecients on detrended output, but they include output growth with relatively large coecients.
45For example, in their Table 3, optimal policy can reduce the standard deviation of in
ation by over 54% in
Australia; by over 71% in Canada, and by over 55% in New Zealand relative to the corresponding models' standard
deviations.
46All the other parameters are kept the same as per the benchmark case.
276 Conclusion
In this paper, we build a small open economy DSGE model, estimate it using Bayesian methods, and
analyze its implications for optimal monetary policy in South Africa. In particular, we investigate
whether the central bank should condition on exchange rate movements when it sets its interest
rate policy via a Taylor rule. The optimal coecients for the policy rule are obtained by minimizing
a loss function that includes the variance of in
ation, output, and the interest rate. We nd that
the optimal policy places a heavier weight on in
ation and output than the estimated Taylor rule
for South Africa, but a zero coecient on the depreciation rate of currency.
The observed emphasis central banks place on exchange rate variations could also be due to
other motives not captured in our model, such as reduction of uncertainty encountered in the export
sector, or in nancial markets. The investigation of these issues is left for future research.
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(A2) National accounting identity:
b yt = b st + b ct + 
 
b c




h;t = b c
h;t 1 + (1   )(b qt + b y
t)
(A4) Imports:
b mt = b ct + [1    (1   )]b st










c mct + e t
47Note that a bar over a variable indicates its steady-state value, and a hat over a variable indicates its log-
deviation from its steady-state (i.e. b xt = logxt  logx). For variables that can become negative, namely, t; at and
(nx=y)t, we used level-deviations instead (i.e. b xt = xt   x).
32(A6) Marginal cost of domestic rms:
c mct = 
b yt   (1 + 
)b zt + b st +

1   
(b ct   b ct 1)
(A7) Foreign-good New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
b f;t =

1 + 'Et [b f;t+1] +
'
1 + 'b f;t 1 +
   1
 (1 + ')




t = (1   )b t 1 + b f;t 1
(A9) Real exchange rate:
b qt   b qt 1 = b dt + b 
t   b t
(A10) Terms of trade:
b st   b st 1 = b f;t   b t
(A11) Deviations from the law-of-one-price:
b  f;t   b  f;t 1 = b dt + b 
t   b f;t
33(A12) Taylor rule:
b it = ib it 1 + (1   i)
h
ab c
t 1 + ayb yt 1 + adb dt
i
+ "i;t
(A14) Uncovered interest-parity condition:





b t   b at
i




b at 1 = 
 
b c
h;t   b mt

(A16) Real interest rate:
b rt =b it   Et [b t+1]
(A17) Productivity shocks:
b zt = zb zt 1 + "z;t
(A18) Demand shocks:
e t = e e t 1 + "e ;t
48The left-hand side of (A15) is the capital account to (trend) GDP ratio, whereas the right-hand side is the
net-exports to (trend) GDP ratio.
34(A19) Mark-up shocks:
e t = "e ;t
(A20) Risk premium shocks:
b t = b t 1 + ";t
(A21) Foreign cost-push shocks:
e 	t = "e 	;t
(A22) Foreign interest rate:
b i
t = 1;ib i
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t = 1;b 
t 1 + 2;b 
t 2 + ";t
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Figure 1: Prior distrib. (grey), posterior distrib. (black) and its mode (green) -1
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Figure 2: Prior distrib. (grey), posterior distrib. (black) and its mode (green) -2
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Figure 4: Prior distrib. (grey), posterior distrib. (black) and its mode (green) -4
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to 1 st.dev. innovation in the Taylor rule, i.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to 1 st.dev. innovation in the productivity shock, z.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to 1 st.dev. innovation in the demand shock, e .
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to 1 st.dev. innovation in the mark-up shock, e .
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to 1 st.dev. innovation in the risk premium shock, .
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Figure 10: Impulse responses to 1 st.dev. innovation in the external cost-push shock, e 	.
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Figure 11: Loss functions when each policy parameter is varied in turn (y = 0:5, i = 1)
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